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AN EVENT STUDY ANALYSIS OF PEOPLE EXPRESS
ABSTRACT
A number of recent papers have studied the relationship between price and
marketstructure in the deregulated airline industry through a cross-sectional
analysis of city-pair markets. Yet, while interesting, several potential
difficulties underlie the inferences drawn in these analyses. In this paper,
we consider an alternative approach that uses stock price reactions to entry
announcements to shed light on the nature of competitive behavior in this
industry. The analysis sheds light on three issues. First, it offers a clean
test of contestable market theory. Second, it provides evidence on the level
of profits or sunk costs present in these markets. Third, it sheds light on
the degree of competitive "localization" existing in the industry. The
particular entry events that we focus on are those involving People Express
Airline in 1984 and 1985. To provide a more complete picture of the effects of
these entry events, we also examine the price and quantity changes that
occurred following entry.
Michael D. Whinston Scott C. Collins
Harvard University Harvard LawSchool
Department of Economics Cambridge, MA 02138
Cambridge, MA 02138I. Introduction
The domestic airline industry has undergone dramatic changes in the last decade.
The passage and implementation of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 led to the entry of
a large number of new carriers, a dramatic change in existing carriers' route and fare
structures, and a notable increase in the use of air transportation services. More recently,
the industry has seen a highly publicized and controversial wave of consolidation through
merger. To evaluate these changes, and to devise proper public policytoward the industry
in the future, an understanding of the nature of competition in the industry is essential. At
the same time, however, the industry possesses a number of features that make achieving
such an understanding difficult.
One of the important features of the industry, for example, is that, because of
economies of scale at the route level, many markets are inevitably served by only one or two
carriers. Thus, the performance of these deregulated markets will often depend heavily on
the constraint of potential rather than actual competition. The degree to which the threat
of entry contrains price—setting by firms active in a market, however, is one of the least well
understood issues in industrial organization. Recent theoretical models differ widely in the
strength that they give to this effect, and relatively little is known empirically abouteither
the process of entry or the impact that its threat has on actual competition.' In approving
the series of recent mergers in the industry, policymakers have adopted the view that
potential competition would prove sufficient to prevent supranormal profits from being
earned.
The underlying premise for this belief finds its clearest formal expression in the
theory of contestable markets of Baumol, Panzar, and Willig [1982]. They demonstratethat
in the absence of sunk costs associated with entry, scale economies need not prevent
'Compare, for example, the theoretical models of Baumol Panzar, and Willig [1982],
Milgrom and Roberts [1984], and Mankiw and Whinston 1986]. A recent paper by Berry
[1989] provides the first empirical examination of entry in the airline industry.
1markets from achieving efficient outcomes. Rather, if potential entrants have access to the
same technology as incumbent firms, then under these conditions potential competition can
fully constrain incumbents' pricing, allowing them only a competitive return.While the
strong assumptions required for this result may not be reasonablein many circumstances,
the theory's proponents cited the airline industry, with its "capital on wings" as being a
prime example of such a market.
Another notable aspect of the industry that makes understanding the determination
of competitive outcomes difficult is the complex multiproduct nature of its firms. A typical
carrier offers service on hundreds of routes. Yet, each of these is really part of an
interrelated network of routes that the carrier serves. This fact naturally gives rise to a
number of difficult questions regarding the nature of competition. For instance, to what
extent is competition "localized" so that competitive outcomes can be thought of on a
route—by—route basis? Is the level of concentration on a route meaningful, or should we only
focus on regional, or even national, measures of concentration? Questions of this sort were
of particular importance during the recent merger wave, for example, as carriers with
relatively modest national market shares proposed mergers that led to substantial regional
and route—specific increases in concentration.2,3
A number of recent studies have examined pricing behavior in the deregulated airline
industry.4 All of these studies have a similar structure. Each seeks to explain the
cross—sectional variation in fares over various city—pair routes. The explanatory variables
2To some degree, this issue is related to that of potential competition. In particular, if
with a sufficient number of potential entrants incumbent pricing is constrained, and if the
most viable potential entrants for a route are those airlines already operating elsewhere,
then regional or national measures of concentration may be most important.
3Some other characteristics of the airline industry that make understanding competitive
outcomes difficult are the tremendous ability to segment demand (price discriminate),
carrier control over airport facilities, and computer reservation system ownership.
4See, for example, Graham Kaplan, and Sibley [1983], Call and Keeler [1985], Bailey,
Graham, and Kaplan [1985, Morrison and Winston [1987], and Borenstein [1988]. For an
interesting, more informal examination of the nature of competition in the airline industry
see Levine [19871.
2include proxies for demand and cost conditions, as well as measures of market structure
(e.g., the route's Herfindahi index). A finding that these traditional measures of a route's
market structure are significant predictors of its fares is taken as evidence that local market
structure matters and that contestability theory is inapplicable. Most of these studies
(though not all) have reached this conclusion.5
Nevertheless, these studies suffer from several problems that could potentially
undermine their inferences. For example, all of these studies treat their sample as a set of
unrelated routes, when in fact (as we have discussed above), they are really all part of an
interrelated network. Another problem is the lack of effective controls for variations in cost
and demand conditions across markets. This problem is in part related to the networking
issue, since the effective marginal cost of flying a plane on a particular city—pair route will
depend upon where the plane can fly from the destination city. It can lead to particularly
misleading results in testing contestability theory. For instance, suppose that the theory is
valid, but that important elements of cost are omitted from the regression. When true costs
are lower than the estimated level of costs we expect to see both unusually low prices jjj
unusually low concentration (typically, more firms will be able to serve the market
profitably), leading to the measurement of a spurious positive correlation between price and
concentration.6
In this paper, we consider an alternative approach to examining the nature of
competitive interaction in the deregulated airline industry. This approach follows recent
studies of regulation in using stock price data to shed light on competitive structure. In
5Some studies also try to examine whether potential entry has any effect on pricing (a
hypothesis of "imperfect contestabilitr according to Morrison and Winston [19871) by
including measures of the number of' viable" potential entrants.
6In some papers the authors utilize an instrumental variables technique in response to the
potential endogeneity of concentration (e.., Graham, Kaplan and Sibley [1983]). Though
in principle this procedure should solve this problem, in practice it is difficult to find
convincing instruments. Typically the authors utilize measures related to a route's
position in the network (e.g., endpoint airport size) that we have just argued are
themselves proxies for unmeasured costs of service that should really already be in the
pricing equation.
3particular, we examine airline stock price reactions to announcements of entry into
airport—pair markets.
Examination of these reactions sheds light on three aspects of competitive interaction
in deregulated airline markets. First, it offers a clean test of contestability theory that
avoids many of the complications inherent in studying pricing behavior (such as controlling
for network effects) and that also focuses on what is in some sense the central prediction of
the theory. Second, it provides evidence on the extent of profits or sunk costs present in
these markets. Third and finally, by relating the pattern of value changes to firms'
competitive positions, we are able to shed light on the degree to which competitive effects
are localized.
The basic idea behind our test of contestable market theory is very simple. In a
contestable market, the absence of sunk costs or cost advantages across carriers and the
presence of free entry leads carriers to earn no economic profits. Furthermore, to the extent
that we see entry and exit in a contestable market, these instances are caused by generalized
cost or demand shifts and continue to leave carriers earning no economic profits. Thus,
when an incumbent carrier faces entry into its market, this occurance should not be
associated with any significant change in value for that firm. A similar proposition holds for
the entrant as well; since he faces a future of zero economic profits, no change in value
should be associated with entry events.
The particular entry events that we focus on here are those involving People Express
airlines during the years 1984 and 1985. For these events, the stock price reactions that we
report below lead us to reject this implication of the contestable market model. In
particular, an average incumbent carrier on a route entered by People Express loses roughly
three to six million dollars in value when entry is announced. On a pre—tax basis, this
corresponds to a loss of roughly sixty to one—hundred percent of the "average" discounted
value of operating profits that can be attributed to these routes and is
4equivalent to the loss that would arise were the incumbent forced to fly its planes completely
empty for roughly three to five months.
Since many industry observers would characterize People Express during this period
as embodying demand and/or cost innovations, it is natural to question exactly what this
rejection means.7 In particular, do we learn any more from this rejection of the contestable
market model (with its assumption of identical costs among firms) than that People Express
did have a different technology?
In fact, we do. In particular, if incumbents on a route suffer value losses because of
People Express' entry, then one of two things must be true. First, these incumbents could
have been earning positive profits prior to entry. Alternatively, they must have had sunk
costs that kept them in the market despite taking these losses. The significant losses from
entry that we measure therefore provide a lower bound on the extent of either profits or
sunk costs existing in these markets prior to entry. In the presence of either of these
elements, however, we would not expect the contestable market model to hold even in the
absence of People Express' innovation. Furthermore, while this finding does not necessarily
imply an inefficient market outcome (e.g., if firms act as price—takers and earn profits due to
cost advantages, then efficiency will still result), it does suggest some basis for concern and
further study.
Finally, these same changes in value allow us to shed light on the issue of competitive
localization. We do find an important element of localization. In particular, the value loss
that we measure for incumbents on an entered route is not felt equally by other carriers.
Indeed, neither carriers with departures at other airports serving the same city—pair, nor
carriers with departures at the newly entered airport suffer losses that are of similar
71n this view People Express' demand—side innovation was the introduction of low frill air
travel, while its cost—side innovations involved changes in operating procedures and labor
costs that were, to some extent, lower than the formerly regulated carriers, Of course, it
could be argued that the existing carriers were potentially able to duplicate these service
and operations procedures. In addition, it is unclear how much of People Express' lower
labor costs were attributable to lower quality workers.
5magnitude to those suffered by the entered route's incumbents. At the same time, however,
we do detect evidence of significant value changes on other carriers. While only twenty
percent of the loss suffered by the average incumbent on the entered route can be attributed
to these general "network" effects, these effects amount to roughly eighty percent of the
aggregate effect on the industry. Thus, while there is a unique local effect, the impact of
entry appears to permeate more generally through the system.
To provide a more complete picture of the effects of these entry events, we also
examine the price, (sales) quantity, and schedule changes that incumbents in these markets
undertook in response to entry. The responses to these events paint a picture similar to that
emerging from our analysis of changes in value. As expected, incumbents on the entered
route dramatically reduced their prices in response to People Express' entry: on average, the
mean of incumbents' prices fell by roughly thirty—five percent. A smaller price reduction of
fifteen percent occurred on the routes involving other airports in the same cities.
Interestingly, though, the incumbents on the entered route seem, if anything, to have
increased both their scheduled service and their sales quantity following entry. Thus, it
appears that the value losses suffered by incumbents were not merely temporary losses
incurred while they scaled back their operations in these markets.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section 2 by discussing our empirical
methodology for examining the value changes associated with our entry events. In Section 3,
we discuss the data used in this investigation. Section 4 then presents our empirical findings
on valuation responses to entry announcements. That section begins with an examination of
a relatively simple specification for examining the issues raised here and then successively
considers more elaborate analyses of these value changes. In Section 5, we then present
evidence on the price, sales quantity, and schedule responses to entry. Finally, Section 6
concludes.
62. Methodology
The basic approach that we use to identify value changes caused by People Express
entry events is the event study.8 Here we use daily stock price data. Unlike the typical
event study, however, here it makes more sense to model the events as causing some
abnormal dollar change in value as opposed to an abnormal return. The reason is that the
dollar loss attributable to being an incumbent in a particular entered market is likely to be
largely independent of the overall size of the carrier. Letting 11(Z)bethe expected dollar
change in the value of firm i when entry events with characteristics Zoccur(Zcould
include the number of events, who are the incumbents, etc.), we can derive the following
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where
therate of return on a share of firm i on day t (including any dividend
payments)
Rft the risk—free rate of interest on day t
Rmt the rate of return on the market portfolio on day t
an indicator variable equal to 1 if some event occurs on day t
V_ the value of firm i's equity on day t—1
it a serially uncorrelated random error term.
8See, for example, Schwert [1981] and Rose [1985] for other examples of the use of this
methodology in industrial organization.
7A central feature of the analysis presented below is that we use differences in carriers'
relative positions to isolate the sources of value changes. For example, one question that we
are particularly interested in examining is whether carriers that are incumbents in the
specific route that People Express enters suffer value losses, and equally important, whether
these value losses are significantly larger than those for carriers that are not incumbents. In
general, this leads us to model the dollar change in value from a particular event k for
carrier i as some function:
f(Z,A)
whereare measurable characteristics of carrier i relevant to event k and A is some
parameter vector that we estimate.9 For example,could be the number of seats that
carrier i offered in the entered market for event k and A might then be the dollar change
in value per seat (a parameter to be estimated). Then, the total value change due to entry





where Et is the set of events occurring on day t.
Below, a number of different specifications for f(..) are investigated. In each case,
however, the basic form of our estimating equations is the same and is derived by
substituting (2) in for 1(Z)in(1). Since =1if and only if Et # ,thisyields:
9Note that A can include individualized parameters (i.e., firm specific fixed effects).
8(RjtRft) =i[V]3i(mt_ft
+it (3)
Then, since f(..) is assumed to be linear in each of these specifications (i.e.,
=.A),(3) can be written as
(itRft) =o ÷fli(Rmt_Rft)+ [+J.A+ (4)
whereEZ'.
kcE
We also examine the change in People Express' value from its entry announcements.
For People Express we simply replace f(.) in (3) with some functon g(Xk,O) whereare
measurable characteristics of the event and 0 are parameters to be estimated.
We simultaneously estimate a system of M equations of the form (4) and one
equation for People Express, where M is the number of carriers other than People Express in
our panel, allowing the {it} to be contemporaneously correlated across the firms.'°,"
Note that by estimating the average dollar effect of entry (as a function of
characteristics), equation (4) controls for differences in debt—equity ratios across firms by
implicitly imposing the assumption that equity is the full residual claimant to all
entry—induced value changes.'2
'0Estimations were performed using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) procedure
in SAS SYSNLIN.
'1We also ran the specifications considered below including a (firm—specific) constant in
equation (4) to allow for misspecification in the asset pricing model. The estimated value
changes for this specification were nearly identical to those reported below.
l2This is essentially the same assumption used in Rose [19851 to control for differing
debt—equity ratios. Rose [19851, however, estimates the event effect in percentage terms,
and so uses the ratio of the book value of equity to total book value of the firm to control
for differing debt equity ratios.
9Finally, up to this point, we have not been very specific about the choice of the
"window" over which the event response is to be measured. For example, if we want a
three—day window with the actual announcement date of the entry at the end of this period,
then event k will be an element of Et if and only if day t is the announcement date of
event k or one of the two trading days immediately prior to that date. Below we examine
several such windows. Note, though, that when we do so, the estimates for A correspond to
the daily average effect over the window: to get our estimate of the total effect of the event
we then multiply by the number of days in the window chosen.
3. Data
Four sorts of information are required for our study of value responses to entry:
event identification, market information for these events, stock data for a panel of airlines,
and general information about these airlines' operations.
3.1Events
The first data issue concerns the definition and identification of relevant events. For
this study, we focus on non—stop domestic entry events into non—slot—constrained
airport—pairs.13 Non—slot—constrained entry events are the appropriate ones to focus on for
an analysis of contestability because, if entry is restricted at these airports, zero operating
profits need not hold. Similarly, international flights are subject to regulation. The time
period covered here is 1984 and 1985. The choice of these years has several advantages:
first, by 1984, six years had passed since the Airline Deregulation Act; second, by 1984,
t3During the period of this study, four airports faced government—regulated take—off and
landing slot restrictions (New York'g LaGuardia and John F. Kennedy Airports,
Washington D.C.'s National Airport, and Chicago's O'Hare Airport).
10nearly all of the flight restrictions due to the 1981 PATCO strike had been lifted;'4 and third,
these years come prior to the recent merger wave.
The set of People Express entry events were identified using Aviation Daily, Iii ilStreetJournal, and IhiiYork Times.'5 The date associated with a particular event
was the date of publication of the earliest report which made it clear that People Express
was entering that route (dates are referred to below in a year/month/day format; e.g.,
850717 is July 17, 1985).16 Most often this date corresponded to the date on which People
Express' announcement of entry was first reported. In three cases, the date used was based
on an Aviation Daily "Intelligence Column" that reported that People Express would enter
the market in question. In total, 24 events were identified. These events are summarized in
Anoendix A.Ascan be seen there, 22 of these 24 events involved Newark Airport.
3.2Market Information
For each entry event, information about the set of incumbents operating in the
entered route needed to be collected. This information was obtained by examining the
edition of the Official Airline Guide issued just prior to the event date.'7 The Official Airline
Guide provides information on all flights offered between two airports by each carrier and
the type of plane used. For this study, two types of flight information were collected. First,
each carrier's number of non—stop flights per week between the entered airport pair by plane
'4Only two non—slot constrained airports were still subject to these IFR Constraints in
1984: Denver and Los Angeles. These constraints were removed in February in Denver
and in August in Los Angeles. None of our events involve these airports while they were
subject to these constraints (or even shortly after their removal).
'The Times/3flStreet Journal Index was used to identify entry
announcements in these publications. For Aviation Daily, all 1984 and 1985 issues were
examined for relevant events.
'6Aviptipn Daily is received in New York in the morning of the date of publication.
'7The Official Airline Guide is published bi—weekly. A complete set of back issues is
available at Northwestern University's Transportation Library.
11type.18 Second, each carrier's number of non—stop flights per week (by plane type) for iJL
otherairport pairs in the city—pair entered (thus, this number will be zero when the cities in
question each have only one airport). This information was then converted into the number
of seats offered by each carrier using plane capacity information.'9
Table I summarizes some of the characteristics of the airport—pair routes entered by
People Express. In order to provide some perspective on these numbers, Table I also reports
the same characteristics for all non—slot constrained entry events by other carriers during
this period, as well as a breakdown into the former trunk airlines, regional airlines, and all
other airlines (newly certified carriers other than People Express, former intrastate carriers,
and carriers that previously went bankrupt).2° As can be seen there, the People Express entry
events are characterized by relatively low numbers of incumbents, high distance, and large
numbers of offered seats per incumbent compared to the average of all other entry events.
Former trunk and regional carriers tended to enter smaller and shorter markets than People
Express which represented extensions off of their existing hubs (and often entered markets
with no incumbents), while the "other" carriers entered less concentrated routes; all three
types of carriers entered markets with much lower numbers of seats per incumbents than did
People Express.21
3.3Stock Dta
'8Actually, only flights using jet aircraft were counted. The only effect of this decision is
that in the 850717 EWR—Albany and EWR—Providence events, Delta Airlines would have
been an incumbent had we counted non—jet flights.
'This capacity information was provided by AVMARK, Inc. (a Washington area
consulting firm) and Official Airline Guide, Inc.
20The People Express data used in this study was collected as part of a larger dataset
containing information on all entry event announcements in 1984 and 1985.
2tThe t—statistics for these comparisons are (i) For People Express vs. All Others
(d.f.=179): #ofincumbents (—1.0), Seats per Incumbent (2.5), Distance (1.4); (ii) People
Express vs. Trunks/Regionals (d.f.=92): Total Seats (1.5), Seats per Incumbent (3.0),





Statistics People Exoress LUOthersTrunks* Regionals** Others
Events with
no incumbents 5 107 35 38 34
Events with
incumbents 19 162 44 30 88
Averages isL events
.itii incumbents: (standard deviations in parentheses)
#ofincumbents 1.68 2.03 1.73 1.77 2.27
(0.78) (1.44) (1.17) (1.57) (1.51)
Herfindalil .722 .718 .782 .808 .654
(.249) (.284) (.270) (.267) (.496)
Total Seats 12,000 11,500 8,800 9,000 13,600
(7,761) (13,500) (7,600) (14,600) (15,600)
Seats
per incumbent 7,100 5,100 5,200 4,100 5,500
(3,283) (3,300) (3,000) (2,900) (3,550)
Distance
miles 892 706 565 595 814
(549) (534) (364) (488) (601)
*Braniffand Continental are counted as an "other" due to bankruptcy.
**Frontieris counted as an"other" due to bankruptcy.A panel of airlines was constructed from two sources. First, the CRSP daily price
tape was used to gather the price, number of shares outstanding, and dividends for all airline
stocks traded on the New York and American Stock Exchanges.22 To the set of sixteen
carriers from this source that were traded every day in our sample period were added four
carriers that were traded on the Over—the—Counter Exchange (and were also traded every
day). The final panel of airlines used in this study is listed in ADDendix .Inall but one
case nearly all of these companies' operations were in the air transportation business.23
3.4Airlines' Operations
At points below we utilize information about a carrier's operations in a given year or
at particular airports (such as the number of scheduled departures performed). All of this
information was obtained from the FAA publication, Airt)ort Activity Statistics Qf
Certificated Route ALt Carriers.
4. Empirical FindingsValue Resjonses
In this section we present and discuss the results of our analysis of value responses.
The presentation starts with discussion of a relatively simple specification of the stock price
reaction to entry into an airport—pair market. This simple specification reveals a strong
drop in value for incumbents on the route in question. To allay a number of plausible
concerns about the interpretation of this finding, and to investigate more thoroughly the
sources of value changes, we then consider successively more elaborate specifications in the
subsections that follow.
22The share data was corrected in several instances to conform to known dates of stock
splits.
23The only exception was United. Even for United, however, over five—eighths of its assets
during the sample period were identified with its airline operations (source: 1986 Annual
Roort).
134.1 :nSimniestSnecification
In attempting to explain the value changes caused by People Express' entry into a
non—stop airport—pair market, the simplest place to start is to model the changes for any
particular firm as being related to the extent to which that firm was an incumbent on the
entered route. For any given event, it is natural to model each incumbent's effect as being
proportional to its share of the seats in service on that route. A more difficult question is
how to achieve comparability across events. We model the aggregate effect on incumbents
in a given event as a function of observable market characteristics prior to entry. In much
of what follows, we model this effect as being proportional to the total number of seatmiles
offered in the entered market prior to entry. This choice reflects two considerations. First,
it seems reasonable to think that the aggregate effect on incumbents in a given event might
be related to market size as measured by available seats. At the same time, since both
customer value and costs increase with distance, it seems unlikely that the total dollar value
change would be equal for a 200 mile market and a 2,000 mile market.24 Given this
choice for modeling the aggregate effect on incumbents in an event, the effect on a particular
incumbent is therefore captured by the number of seatmiles offered by that incumbent.
Thus, we take the function f(..) discussed in Section 2 to be
f(..)SM
where SM is carrier i's number of seatmiles per year in the non—stop airport—pair entered
in event k and where ,aparameter to be estimated, measures the dollar change in value for
firm i per (annualized) scatmile (we switch to an annualized basis here to simplify some
comparisons that we will make below).25 To capture the dollar change in People Express'
24This choice is also consistent with standard industry reporting practices which typically
report values of such items as "operating profit per available seatmile."
2That is, the variable SM measures the total number of seatmiles that an incumbent
would have flown in a year based on the number that it was flying during the period just
14value we simply set g(.) =0, aparameter to be estimated.
One can, of course, think of reasons why alternative ways of capturing this aggregate
incumbency effect might be superior. For example, longer non—stop routes might be more
competitive because of the greater substitutability of connecting competition, leading value
losses to be decreasing rather than increasing in distance. Likewise, if People Express' scale
of entry is independent of market size, then we might see the aggregate value loss from an
event be roughly independent of the number of seats in service on a route. For this reason,
we explore alternative representations of this aggregate effect in Section 4.5. As we shall see
there, the basic insights from our seatmile formulation turn out to be fairly robust.
This basic specification was estimated for three different event windows: a one day
window, a two day window with the announcement day at the end of the period, and a three
day window with the announcement day at the end.26 The results are reported below in Table
2(standarderrors are in parentheses).
Table 2
TotalDollar Value R,esDonsePeorile ExDress Entry
Window
Variable 1 ix 2
IncumbentEffect —.0109 —.0147 —.019 1
per Annualized (.0035) (.0049) (.0061)
Seatmile (SM)
People Express Effect —354 440 —1,293
(1,000's) (1,103) (1,548) (1,914)
prior to the entry announcement.
261n earlier work we also examined a three day window with the announcement day in the
middle. This was done to check whether significant information was incorporated into
stock prices after the announcement day. Our results indicated no such effect.
15The results in Table paint a clear picture concerning the effect of entry on
incumbents. Incumbents experienced a total drop in value whose point estimate ranges,
depending on the window employed, between —.0109 and —.0191 per seatmile (the estimates
in Table are the value change; that is, the number given for the two day effect is
twice the estimated daily average change during the event window). The estimates all allow
one to reject the hypothesis of no effect with very high levels of confidence (t statistics
between —2.98 and —3.15).
In addition to being statistically significant, the estimated value changes in Table
are also significant in economic terms. On average, these point estimates imply a total
dollar loss of between 6.2 and 10.9 million dollars per event for all incumbents combined and
of between 3.7 and 6.5 million dollars per incumbent. At the forty—six percent tax rate
prevailing in these years, this would correspond to a pre—tax loss of between 6.8 and 12.0
million dollars per incumbent.
Some comparisons may also help give a feel for the size of this loss. The (weighted)
average of annual operating income per seatmile for our incumbents over 1984 and 1985 is
.0042.27 Using the weighted average estimated value of beta for our incumbents (1.53) and the
(post—war) average risk—free and market returns, this implies a risk—adjusted discounted
value of operating income of .034 per seatmile. Thus, our point estimates, which reveal a
pre—tax loss of between .0202 and .0354 per (annualized) seatmile, correspond to a range of
pre—tax loss of roughly 60 to 100 percent of the risk—adjusted discounted value of operating
income that can be attributed in this way to the entered route.28
In assessing this comparison, several points should be kept in mind. On one hand,
operating income overstates the conceptual quantity of interest, and thus understates the
relative importance of the measured losses, because it includes income attributable to
27The weights used for each airline correspond to that airline's share of the total seatmiles
People Express entered against.
28We can also compare the loss with the average equity value per seatmile per year of
.0178. Thus, incumbents lose a similar fraction of this value.
16imputed rents on planes owned by the carriers while the economic profits of interest to us
are only those associated with operations. On the other hand, at least three factors may
cause the importance of these losses to be overstated in this comparison. First, these
markets may not be "average markets" in terms of profitability since People Express may
elect to enter routes that are relatively more profitable for incumbents. Second, this
operating income figure gives average income while we are interested in the incremental
profits associated with serving a route. If, for example, carriers have substantial
(non—route--specific) fixed costs, then incremental profits will exceed average profits. Third,
this comparison may not shed much light on the absolute value of the loss as operating
income may be small under certain theories (e.g., under contestability, if a carrier rents all
of its planes, it has an operating income of zero).
Another comparison that does give some sense of the absolute loss from entry arises
from comparing our estimated declines in value to the (weighted) average of annual revenue
per seatmile for our incumbents, which is .081. On a pre—tax basis, then, the measured loss
is between 25 and 43 percent of this quantity. Put differently, an average incumbent's
pre—tax loss is comparable to that arising from it being forced to fly its planes completely
empty for roughly three to fjy months.29
Finally, there are a number of reasons why the estimates in Table 2 may either over
or underestimate the true effect of entry on incumbents. The next several sections will be
considering several possibilities that might lead to overestimates. On the other hand, at
least three effects might bias our results toward obtaining underestimates. First, we could
be misdating events. Second, the market may partially anticipate these events and therefore
capitalize some of the losses attributable to entry prior to our event window.30 Third, some
value changes may also be felt by debt—holders or workers (if there is rent—sharing).
290f course, the actual decline in annual revenue implied by this figure depends on how
long People Express was expected to be in the market (or how long it was expected to be
pricing aggressively) and on the effect of entry on incumbents' costs.
30See Appendix C for a discussion of this point.
17Turning to the estimated value changes for People Express, we see that these are
small (below one million dollars in absolute value), imprecisely estimated, and of
inconsistent sign. One possible interpretation of these estimates is that while the market did
not know where People Express would expand, the general scale of People Express'
expansion was essentially fully anticipated. This would lead to little effect on People
Express' stock value assuming they made an optimal choice (from among some set of largely
equivalent options), but a (potential) drop in value for the firms it entered against. One
problem with this view, however, lies in its prediction that the expected value change for the
entire set of possible incumbents should be zero, a prediction we find falsified in the next
section.3' A second interpretation of these stock reactions arises from viewing People Express
during this period as being largely a "spoiler," lowering incumbents' returns while making
little itself. In fact, the beginning of our sample period roughly coincides with what is
perceived to have been a shift in People Express' strategy toward entering larger markets
served by the major airlines —astrategy that some observers feel was a mistake for the
airline.32
4.2Controlling f.GeneralEffects
While the results above demonstrate that airport—pair incumbents experienced a drop
in value, they do not identify whether these value changes are unique to these firms or are
instead part of a more general reaction to a People Express entry announcement that is felt
by all firms in the industry. Investigating whether there is such a differential impact on
airport—pair incumbents is of interest for two reasons. First, in examining the localization
issue, we are interested in the extent to which economic outcomes on a route are uniquely
sensitive to that route's market structure. Second, in examining the contestability
3'Admittedly, we do not have all possible incumbents in our panel, but the only notable
one missing is Frontier.
32One analyst described the history of People Express to us has having "two periods:
before Minneapolis and after."
18hypothesis, and in identifying the degree of losses due to incumbency on an entered route, we
want to distinguish route—specific value changes from several more indirect effects. For
example, even if the contestability model is generally applicable, our entry events may
indirectly affect values in those areas where regulation leads to carrier rents: international
flights and flights from slot—constrained airports. A second concern arises from the
recognition that carriers are not only providers of air transportation services (the arguably
contestable market) but also are owners of airplanes. If People Express entry events are
correlated with changes in the values of these airplanes, then carriers may generally be
observed to experience value declines coincident with entry announcements.33
To control for such a general effect, we introduced firm specific fixed effects into the
specification discussed above.34 More specifically, the function f(.) now takes the form for
firm i of:
f(..).+7SM1
For example, in the case of value losses due to indirect effects on slot-constrained
departures, the would be related to the level of slots that each carrier possessed. The
results for this specification are presented below in Table .
33Thatis, contestability predicts zero operating profits 'iven the rental rate on airplanes.
As owners of airplanes, however, carriers may experience value changes. Such a correlation
could potentially arise from two different effects. First, a decline in the value of airplanes
(which leads to lower rental rates) could cause new entry opportunities to develop. Second,
if the stock of planes is fixed in the short—run, then People Express entry events could
potentially either increase the price of planes (by increasing demand for air travel) or
decrease their price (by leading to travel with higher load factors). Admittedly, both of
these effects seem somewhat unlikely, the former because of our use of daily data and the
latter because of the small size of People Express relative to the worldwide market for used
planes.
34Further controls for slot effects are discussed below in Section 4.3.
19Table
TotalValue ResnonseEntry: Fixed Effects SDecification
Window
Variable I 2 i a
IncumbentEffect per —.0127 —.0168 —.0221
per AnnualizedSeatmile(SM) (.0040) (.0057) (.0070)
PeopleExpress Effect —256 147 —1,460
(1,000's) (1,144) (1,606) (1,986)
Sum of —30,841 —35,008 —28,212
Fixed Effects (17,621) (17,621) (17,806)
(1,000's)
As can be seen in Table ,allowingfor these effects has little effect on our previous
conclusions and, if anything, slightly increases the point estimates of the size of the
incumbent effects (while slightly increasing their standard errors).
The third row in Table reports the sum of the estimated fixed effects and the
standard errors of these estimates. While their standard errors are large (the hypothesis
that the sum is zero can be rejected at critical values between .05 and .11), these estimates
reveal two interesting points. First, for the average firm, the loss suffered when an event
occurs is roughly four times larger (at the mean of the estimated ranges) when it is an
incumbent (6.8 million) than when it is not (1.7 million).35 Thus, the losses attributable to
the specific market entered are a large share of value loss for an incumbent firm. At the
same time, at an industry level, the losses attributable to these other sourcesmake up (at
the mean of the estimated ranges) roughly 80 percent of the total value loss (31.6 million
versus 8.6 million), indicating that there are important effects felt elsewhere inthe network.
weighted average of these fixed effects based on carrier's extent of incumbency (asdone
earlier) reveals a loss of 3.2 million for the "average incumbent." Thus, as wouldbe
expected, these generalized effects were felt more heavily by those carriers who were more
likely to be entered.
204.3Controlling LQL Effects
The concern that the effects we are measuring could be due to effects on departures at
slot—constrained airports raises another issue. Twenty—two of the 24 events in this study
involved Newark International Airport which, to some extent, may compete with two
slot—constrained airports (LaGuardia and Kennedy) for New York area air traffic. If there is
a positive correlation between those carriers serving Newark and those carriers serving
LaGuardia and Kennedy airports, then we may have merely been picking up effects on these
slot-constrained departures in the results above.
We took two approaches to control for this effect. First, we included variables,
OSM, that measured the number of seatmiles that a carrier i flew between the city—pair
involved in event k at airport combinations other than the entered airport—pair (e.g., if the
airport pair entered was Newark—Cleveland, we now measure all other flights between
airports in Cleveland and the New York metropolitan area). If slot-constrained departure
effects are fully explaining the estimates above, then we should now see all of the value
change be captured by the OSM variable. In addition, the estimate of the OSM effect is of
independent interest as it provides a measure of the importance and effect of substitution
between airports within a city. Thus, we now let the function f(.) be,
f(..) =+SM+Ø0SM
In our sample of events, nearly all of these other (i.e., OSM) seatmiles involve
slot-constrained departures from New York area airports to the same destination airport.
In fact, only two of our 24 events involved flights to an airport other than Kennedy or
LaGuardia that was not part of the airport—pair entered by People Express. Compared to
the average total number of seatmiles on the airport—pair entered (8,718,000 per week), the
number at other airports in the city—pair (21,860,800 per week) was roughly two and a half
times as large. Most of this difference is explained by the larger number of incumbents
21serving these other airports, an average of 2.71 compared to 1.33 for the entered airport—pair
(these are averages over all of our events).36 Quite often the carrier serving the entered
airport—pair (usually involving Newark) also served the other airports in the city—pair: the
probability that OSMI >0given SMk >0was .719 over all events and .793 for New York
area events. Thus, our ability to distinguish between the main airport—pair route effect
(SM) and the effect due to routes involving these other airports (OSM) stems largely from
the difference in the value changes for these dual operating carriers compared to the value
changes for those operating only at the other airports.
The results for this specification are presented in Table 4.
Table 4
TotalValue ResronseEntry: Including Other Airnort Seatmiles
Window
Variable 1i
IncumbentEffect per —.0158 —.0203 —.0200
perAnnualized Seatniile (SM) (.0053) (.0075) (.0092)
Other Airports .0025 .0028 —.00 17
Incumbent Effect(OSM) (.0028) (.0039) (.0048)
People Express Effect —262 140 —1,456
(1,000's) (1,144) (1,606) (1,986)
Inclusionof the OSM variables does little to change our earlier findings. The point
estimates of the SM effect for the one and two day windows grow slightly larger in absolute
size while that for the three day window falls a bit. The standard errors of all three
estimates increase, but we may still reject the hypothesis of no effect on the entered
36Thus, the average number of seatmiles per incumbent was 6,539,000 per week for the
entered airport—pair compared to 8,072,000 at the other airports (note that these averages
include events with no incumbents).
22airport—pair with a high degree of confidence. The estimates of the other airport effect, on
the other hand, are small (approximately an order of magnitude smaller than those for the
entered airport pair), imprecisely estimated, and of inconsistent sign. Thus, there appears to
be little evidence of a marked drop in value for airlines operating on these other routes, but
we continue to see evidence of a strong effect on those airlines operating on the entered
route.37
Even if all value changes are due to departures at New York slot—constrained
airports, however, one might still see little of this effect being picked up in the OSM variable
if these effects were felt generally by all carriers at the slot—constrained airport. For
example, if the basic hypotheses of contestability about the ease of entry into a route held
true for carriers with operations at slot—constrained airports (that is, if any carrier could
could easily change the use of a slot to serve another market), we would expect to see the
profit level of all departures at that airport equalized (though not to zero). Thus, entry
would lead to general adjustments in all carriers' flights at that airport and each carrier
would bear an equal loss in value per slot.38 If the SM variable were more correlated with the
levels of these effects (the ownership of slots in our example) than was the OSM variable,
then our SM effect may still be picking up these slot effects. While our use of firm specific
fixed effects already largely controls for this possibility (since 22 of 24 events were Newark
371t is worth noting however, that the usual intuitions regarding the value effects on
substitute airports a drop in value,but a smaller one than at the entered airport) need not
hold here. One reason arises from the importance of demand segmentation in this industry
and from People Express' role as a niche carrier serving low willingness—to-—pay travelers.
People Express' entry at Newark puts the Newark incumbent at risk of losing a large share
of his discount fare travelers. If this causes this incumbent to cut back service, or take
other actions to decrease its attractiveness to business travelers, the benefits to a carrier at
LaGuardia of gaining the Newark incumbent's business travelers could more than
compensate for any losses he suffers in discount fare travelers. Thus, not finding a negative
effect on value at the other airports does not necessarily imply a lack of substitution
between airports.
38This statement assumes that the distribution of each carrier's slots by the time—of—day is
the same. Note also that one can equivalently think of this point as imputing a value to
slots which changes with entry (while operating profits net of this implicit slot rental rate
remain at zero for all airlines at the airport).
23events), our second approach allowed for separate fixed effects for New York area and






Incumbent Effect per —.0144 —.0189 —.0 172
perAnnualized Seatmile(SM) (.0054) (.0077) (.0094)
OtherAirports .0020 .0019 —.0038
Incumbent Effect(OSM) (.0028) (.0040) (.0049)
People Express Effect —268 121 —1,486
(1,000's) (1,144) (1,606) (1,986)
Again, this change has little effect on our estimates of the SM and OSMeffects.In
general, these effects grow slightly smaller in absolute magnitude whenthese separate fixed
effects are included. A quasi—likelihood ratio test of the difference between the New York
and non—New York fixed effects (not reported in Table )comesnowhere near rejecting
equality for the two andthreeday windows (significance levels between .90 and .75) and
could reject for the one day window at a significance level of approximately .20.
4.4Examining Airport Effects
While the results of the previous section cast doubt over the view that the declines in
value realized by airport—pair incumbents upon People Express' entry wereattributable to
losses due to regulated slot constrained departures, it is still of considerable interest to
explore other alternative sources of rent whose value declines maybe picked up by our SM
variable. A possibility of particular interest is the extent to which People Expresshas
24effects on other carriers operating at the new airport that it has begun to serve. This could
happen for a number of reasons. First, People's flights to Newark often connected with
other flights and thus would offer some competition to non—stop flights originating at the
new airport destined for a third city (which People Express flew to from Newark).
Alternatively, People Express' presence at the airport may, by lowering its cost of entry into
other markets emanating from that airport, have constrained existing carriers' pricing to
some degree.
To examine this effect, we constructed a set of variables, EPORT,whichmeasured
the number of departures that carrier i had at the airport that People Express entered in
event k in the year of that event.39 Typically, the incumbent carriers (SM>0 and OSM>0) in
an event had disproportionately large shares at the new airport. For example, carriers with
SM>0 accounted for, on average, 44.3 percent of all new airport departures, while those with
either SM>O or OSM>0 accounted for an average of 59.1 percent of newairport departures.4°
The average numbers of departures are described below in Table .
Table
Average Number Qf Departures jj Newly Entered Airport
Allcarriers SM>0 carriers OSM>0 carriers
All events 3,444 29,616 19,936
New York
events 3,652 31,400 20,327
These numberssuggest that if anairport effect is present, our incumbency variable
391nall cases except the 841114 MSP—PIE event, People enteredan airport that it did not
yet serve. In that case EPORT was set equal to zero for all carriers.
40These figures are conditional on the set of events withsome incumbents (either SMor
OSM)andexcludethe 841114MSP—PIE event.
25SM may be picking it up. At the same time, however, the closerelationship between the
two variables may make it difficult to distinguish between the two effects. The estimates
from this procedure, which also included separate New York and non—New York firm
specific fixed effects, are reported in Table .
26Table 7
Total Value ResDonseEntry:
Including Entered Airport Departures
Window
Variable 1. X 2x
Airport—Pair —.0126 —.0154 —.0142
Incumbent Effect (SM) (.0058) (.0082) (.0101)
Other Airports .0026 .0029 —.0029
Incumbent Effect (OSM) (.0029) (.0041) (.0050)
Entered Airport(EPORT) —33.8 —63.9 —55.4
Departures Effect (38.2) (54.3) (66.5)
People Express Effect —262 132 —1,477
(1,000's) (1,144) (1,606) (1,986)
Test of SNS=OPORT=0: X2(2)=7.9 X2(2)=7.5 X2(2)=4.O
(approx. probability
of statistic >x2 under
null)
(.025) (.025) (.15)
Sum of New York —36,238 —34,622 —24,534 Area Fixed Effects (19,136) (19,054) (19,209
(1,000's)
Sum of NY less 41,518 —24,640 —13,629 Sum of non—NY (85,381) (85,534) (85,872) Fixed Effects (1,000's)
Inclusion of the EPORT variables lowers the point estimate of the airport—pair
incumbent (SM) effect for each of our estimates while also slightly decreasing the precision
of our estimates. Indeed, it is no longer possible to reject the hypothesis of no SM effect for
the three day window (t—statistics for the three windows are —2.18, —1.89, and —1.43
respectively). Relative to our initial findings reported in Table 2,however,this stems
27largely from the decreases in precision caused as we added more variables; the point
estimates here are of roughly equal magnitude to those we started with. The estimates of
the EPORT effect, on the other hand, provide some weak evidence of a negative effect on
carriers operating at the entered airport: for all three windows the point estimate is
negative, although in none of the cases can we reject the hypothesis of no effect at
conventional significance levels. Table also reports the quasi—likelihood ratio statistics for
the joint hypothesis that there is no effect from entry on either entered airport—pair
incumbents or airlines operating at the newly entered airport. This hypothesis can be
rejected at a significance level of .025 for the one and two day windows, but only at a .15
level for the three day window. Using these estimates we can also compare the dollar losses
due to the SM and EPORT effects. Table apresentsthese dollar losses.
Table a
AverageLosses jj Route Incumbency Versus
PresenceNewly Entered Airoort
j• jj: Average 1.
EPORT All carriers $116,367$220,062$190,755
EPORT SM>0 carriers1,000,674 1,892,379 1,640,356
SM SM>O carriers 4,294,680 5,248,099 4,839,491
Tableaofferstwo basic facts. First, for an average carrier, the total dollar loss due
to the EPORT effect is relatively modest. Second, even for airport—pair incumbents —who
have much larger than average EPORT effect losses —the loss due to route incumbency far
outweighs the estimated losses due to the EPORT effect.
Finally, Table also reports both the sum of the New York area fixed effects and the
difference in the sums of the New York area and non—New York area fixed effects. The New
York area estimates are similar to those seen in Section 4.2; as would be expected with only
28two non—New York events, the differences in the New York and non—New York effects are
very imprecisely estimated.
4.5Alternative Soecifications
As we noted in Section 4.1, one can readily come up with arguments for alternative
specifications of the aggregate effect on incumbents from an entry announcement. To
examine the robustness of our conclusions, we therefore estimated for the one—day event
window a model that allowed this effect to be a more general function of seats and distance.
In particular, we replaced our seatmile measure SM with a specification of the form:
[+*SEATSk+ p*IMSTk + *DISTk*SEATSkJ
*SH (5)
where SEATSk and DISTk are the level of total available seats and distance in event k
and SH1 is firm i's share of the seats in service for that event. Note thatSM, our
earlier measure corresponds to the case where w=cp=p=O.
-Wealso replaced the seatmile measure for the other airport—pairs, OSM, witha
form parallel to (5) but where the SEATS and SH variablescorrespond to these other airport
pairs. Thus, six additional parameters were estimated.
A test for the significance of these additional sixparameters comes no where close to
rejecting our previous specification, producing a x2 statistic of 3.4 [prob (x2>3.4)&75J.4'
Of the three additional terms in expression (5), the mostimportant one seems to be that
involving DIST. For example, if we pick one of these three new terms as our maintained
hypothesis instead of the DIST*SEATS term and perform a similar test for significance of
the other terms, the x2 statistics are 4.5 for the DISTterm, 6.8 for SEATS, and 7.5 for
just a constant. Likewise, if we start with the DIST and DIST*SEATS terms and test the
4tThis test was run using the specifications in Table .
29inclusion of the two remaining terms in (5), the statistic is only 2.4 [Prob
(X2>2.4).65]. In contrast, reversing this procedure to test the null hypothesis that only the
constant and SEATS terms are needed gives a x2 statistic of 6.5 [prob (X2>6.5).16].
Given these results, we examined more fully a specification involving both the DIST
and the DIST*SEATS terms. In general, collinearity makes it difficult to say much about
the separate effects of these terms. Despite this fact, however, we can still get a reasonably
precise estimate of the overall value response attributable to the entered and other airport
pairs. To aid in comparison with our earlier results, Table describes the implied effect per
seatmile for both the entered and other airport—pairs for the various specifications
considered earlier.42
Table
Implied Value ResDonse er Seatmile at SamDIe Means
(1 Day Window)
Snecification in Table :
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Entered —.0114 —.0130 —.0141 —.0122 —.0118
Airport—Pair (.0035) (.0040) (.0055) (.0058) (.0059)
Other — — —.0009 —.0017 —.0009
Airport—Pairs (.0037) (.0041) (.0047)
As can be seen in Table ,thisspecification yields results for the entered airport—pair that
are very close to those we obtained earlier; the point estimates are slightly larger when the
other airport—pair terms are not included, and slightly smaller when they are. The other
airport—pair effect, on the other hand, is now uniformly negative and quite small. Thus, our
previous conclusions seem robust with respect to more elaborate modelling of the aggregate




To get a more complete sense of the effects of our entry events, we also examined the
price, sales quantity, and schedule responses that accompanied them. The evidence from
this investigation broadly corroborates the conclusions from our examinations of value
responses and also provides some interesting additional insights.
Tableprovides information on the year to year percentage changes in the mean
coach class price (p,), standard deviation of coach prices (q1),andtotal quantity of
coach tickets sold (Q)ofairlines other than People Express for our New York area events
from 1984 to 1985 and from 1985 to 1986. Since our interest is in examining the effect of
entry, Table ifi breaks these events into two groups, those markets entered in 1984 and
those entered in 1985, with the aim of using the set of markets not entered in a given year as
a control group for those that were.
Our data comes from the DOT Origin DestinationSurvey for the first quarters of
1984, 1985, and 1986. Thus, to compute the yearly percentage change from say 1984 to
1985, we compare the 1st quarters of these years. This forces us to exclude two events that
occurred in the first quarter of 1985 from consideration as we are unable to identify a single
year as the year of entry. Also excluded from Table jQ are two other events, one which did
not have a Newark incumbent in the first quarter of 1984 (Nashville), and the other in which
People Express switched to another airport—pair within the same city—pair before a year
elapsed (San Francisco). Finally, this data is for all direct flights between Newark airport
and the new city; that is, in contrast to our analysis above, both non—stop and multi—stop
tickets are included as long as no change of plane occurred.
43We restrict attention to New York area events to increase the similarity of the markets
under consideration.
44This data was very kindly provided to us by Severin Borenstein. It arises from a 10
percent sample of tickets.
31Table jQ
% Price/Quantity Changes f Newark Incumbents
Mean Price Quantity Stnd.Dev. of Price
Markets 84/85 85/86 84/85 85/86 84/85 85/86 Entered in:
1984 —33 0 +108 +12 —28 +21
(#=7) (26) (15) (101) (22) (21) (29)
1985 +2 —35 +36 +86 +27 +1
(#=8) (24) (21) (40) (107) (48) (44)
t statistic for
differences 2.5 3.5 0.6 0.6 2.6 1.0
in means
(d.f. = 13)
The striking fact about Table jQ is that the results for those markets entered in 1984
and those entered in 1985 are almost mirror images of each other. As is the popular
perception, there was a dramatic fall of roughly 35 percent in the average price of
incumbents in markets entered by People Express in a given year. In contrast, almost no
change in average price occurred in markets not entered in a given year. These price
reductions were presumably necessitated by People Express' dramatically lower fares. For
this sample of markets, People Express' average fare in the first quarter of the year following
entry was an average of 19 percent below the incumbent airlines' mean fare even after the
price reductions noted in Table IQ. In addition to these declines in mean price, People
Express entry seems to be associated with a decrease or lower increase in price dispersion
though to a greater extent in 1984/85 than in 1985/86. This difference between years could
in part reflect airlines' increasing sophistication in the use of yield management systems over
this period, so that by 1985/86 an airline could more effectively target price reductions
where they were most effective.
Finally, the change in tickets sold by incumbents following entry is notable. Though
there is a high degree of variation evident in the data, it appears that entry by People
32Express is associated with, if anything, an increase in incumbents' number of tickets sold.45
To investigate the causes of this sales increase further, we also examined incumbents'
schedule changes following entry (increases in scheduled capacity can increase sales holding
price fixed by increasing flight frequency and by lowering the likelihood of turning away
customers when flights are full). We did this by comparing the number of (non—stop) seats
offered by incumbents on the entered route exactly one year following the entry
announcement to the number calculated for the time of announcement (we again used the
Official Airline Guide). The average change for the markets examined in Table j was a 25
percent increase in seats (standard deviation of 42 percent). This is to be contrasted with
the average annual increase over 1984—86 in domestic seats offered at Newark airport by
carriers other than People Express of 11 percent.46 Thus, People Express entry seems to be
associated with, if anything, increases in incumbents' scheduled capacity. To get a fuller
picture of these capacity changes, we also examined the extent to which they were due to
increases in flight frequency as compared with increases in the number of seats available per
flight (again calculated using the Official Airline Guide). In fact, nearly all of the change in
capacity was due to changes in flight frequency; the average number of seats per flight in the
entered markets increased only 6 percent (standard deviation of 20 percent) compared to a
1984—86 average increase at Newark airport for carriers other than People Express of 3
percent.
45lndeed, these quantity increases made revenue fall by much less than might have been
expected given the price reductions. The average revenue change in 1984/85 for 1984
entered markets was +21 percent (s.d. =22percent) while 1985 entered markets
experienced a revenue change of +33 percent (s.d. =28percent) in that year; in 1985/86
the change for entered markets was +3 percent (s.d. =29percent) while it was +10
percent (s.d. =16percent) for non—entered markets. Note, though, that incumbents'
losses were likely to be larger than this both because an increase inpassengers carried raises
costs holding capacity fixed and because, as we document in the text, incumbents' seem to
have increased their capacity on these routes following entry. Finally, it should be noted
that only effects on coach class are documented here.
461n fact, this comparison understates the difference since the data yielding the 11 percent
figure (from the FAA's Airtort Activity Statistics) include the entered markets. The same
point applies below, where we make similar comparisons.
33One must be somewhat careful in interpreting these changes, since they may not only
reflect direct responses to People Express entry but may also reflect the results of changes in
underlying demand and cost conditions in the entered markets. Indeed, in principle these
exogenous changes (demand increases or generalized cost decreases) could be the very factors
causing entry in these markets.47 Nevertheless, given the magnitude of the changes observed
here, it may not be unreasonable to assume that much of what we are observing is a direct
response to People Express' entry.48 If so, then the observed changes in sales and capacity in
response to entry are particularly interesting. These responses indicate that incumbents'
losses did not arise during a temporary period of adjustment toward a lower scale of
operations. This would seem to rule out at least some models of market behavior. It is
difficult, for example, to imagine any simple model of competitilve behavior giving rise to
both price reductions and quantity increases by incumbents following entry.49 In addition, in
most commonly used static models of oligopoly, the typical response of incumbents to entry
involves decreases in capacity and sales along with decreases in price (e.g., Kreps and
Scheinkman [1983]). While one can write down static models in which this is not true (e.g.,
if the slope of demand significantly flattens as own price falls), these responses at least raise
the possibility that incumbent airlines may have been following some more complicated
dynamic strategy. In particular, as some industry observers claim, incumbents may have
elected to respond aggressively in the hope of spurring exit or at least discouraging entry
This point, combined with the difficulty of measuring these demand and cost conditions
(especially cost), is one reason why it is difficult to draw conclusions about contestability
from observed price and quantity changes following entry.
48While we do not have the data to confirm it, we suspect that a large fraction of these
observed changes occurred in a short period following entry. Though not determinative,
this would also suggest that much of these changes is a direct response to the entry event.
491t also seems to run counter to the view that the contestable model held prior to People
Express' entry. The difficulty here, though, lies in specifying exactly what the model with
People Express looks like. If one specifies a Bertrand—like pricing mechanism (which
generates the standard contestable outcome absent People Express), the entry of a more
efficient firm should generally lead to quantity reductions for incumbents (consider, for
example, the case where there is a single monopolist incumbent).
34into other of their markets.50
We also performed a similar exercise for the other airport—pairs (typically trips
between the newly entered airport and either Kennedy or LaGuardia airports in New York).




Mean Price Sales Quantity Stnd.Dev. fPrice
Markets 84/85 85/86 84/85 85/86 84/85 85/56
Entered in:
1984 —14 +1 +12 +1 +2 +6
(#=7) (22) (13) (34) (27) (28) (16)
1985 +9 —15 —5 +2 +52 —12
(#=8) (18) (12) (16) (21) (42) (11)
t statistic for
differences 2.1 2.3 1.2 0.1 2.5 2.6
in means
(d.f. =13)
Once again the 1984 and 1985 events contrast notably depending upon the year of
entry; we again see declines in the mean of prices and, if anything, quantity increases for
incumbents associated with entry. Consistent with our value response finding, however,
these changes are much smaller than those for the entered airport—pair. Analysis of schedule
data also again reveals increases in capacity on these routes: the average change in
incumbent capacity in the year following announcement is 11 percent (standard deviation of
501n this regard, it is interesting to note that the capacity increases were significantly larger
in 1984 than in 1985 (an average of 48 percent versus 5 percent with standard deviations of
52 percent and 14 percent); by 1985 it may have been clearer that People Express' future
was likely to be short.
3530) in comparison to an average annual change at Kennedy and LaGuardia airports during
this period of minus 1 percent. More than all of this increase in capacity can be attributed
to changes in flight frequency; seats per flight fell by 4 percent (standard deviation of 9
percent) versus a 1984—86 decrease at these airports of only 2 percent.51 Finally, as in Table
IQ, entry is associated with a reduction or lower increase in the standard deviation of prices,
which is again larger in 1984 than in 1985.
6. Conclusion
Our analysis of the value changes caused by People Express' entry sheds light on
three aspects of competitive interaction in the deregulated airline industry. First, the
significant losses incurred by incumbents in markets entered by People Express lead us to
reject the contestable market model. Second, these same estimated losses provide a lower
bound on the extent of profits or sunk costs present in these markets prior to entry. Aside
from its more general interest, this evidence of pre—entry profits or sunk costs suggests that
the contestable market model was unlikely to be valid as a model of competitive behavior
even in the absence of People Express' innovation (that is, among the established carriers).
Third, the pattern of value changes across carriers provides insight into the extent of
competitive localization in the industry. This pattern reveals an important element of
localization: over eighty percent of the loss suffered by incumbent carriers is attributable to
their presence on the entered route. At the same time, we do detect a significant general
"network" effect that accounts for roughly eighty percent of the industry's value change
when an event occurs. Moreover, the price and quantity responses to entry that we
document, in addition to being interesting in their own right, also seem broadly consistent
with the view that emerges from these estimated value changes.
We find these conclusions to be of considerable interest, and think they affirm the
It is interesting to note the (weak) evidence of somewhat different flight frequency versus
seats per flight responses at these airports as compared with Newark airport.
36analysis of stock data as a potentially fruitful avenue for learning about competitive
behavior in industries. Nevertheless, two caveats should be made in closing. First, there are
clearly limits to the ability of the methods used here to answer many natural questions
about the sources of market power in the industry and the resulting forms of competitive
interaction. To answer these questions, other techniques, involving detailed direct
examination of pricing and other strategic choices of the airlines, are necessary.
Unfortunately, as our earlier discussion has indicated, we feel that correctly modeling the
complexity of these choices is likely to be a very difficult task.
The second caveat concerns our approach's strong reliance on the assumption that the
market is correctly evaluating the competitive effects we are examining, as well as on the
other assumptions of the event study method (e.g., see Appendix C). No doubt, this is a
qualification that should be kept in mind in evaluating our results. Yet, we feel that it is
important to think of this concern in the context of the existing literature. Our findings are
valuable in part, we think, because their potential weaknesses differ dramatically from those
that arise in nearly all of this literature.
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840910 EWR—San Francisco "probably also Cleveland
840910 EWR—Denver and New Orleans"
841003 EWR—Cleveland NJT.
341026 EWR—Orlando A1 "IntelligenceColumn' report







350411 EWR—Birmingham "Intelligence Column" report that
People's would begin service
350417 EWR—Raleigh
Durham
350417 EWR—Charlotte article saying People's was finalizing




Ft. Worth "Intelligence Column" report that
People's would begin service
50710 EWR—Atlanta "Intelligence Column" report that
People's would begin service
A-i850717 EWR—Albany NYT
850717 EWR—Providence NYT
850828 Denver—San Diego Afl..NYT.
850828 EWR—New Orleans NYT. .SJ.
850828 EWR—St. Louis NYT.
Datesare given by year/month/day

























Texas Air * AMEX
9s classified as a formerly bankrupt carrier in Table j.
**Actuaily held the stock of Continental and New York Air. In the analysis, all event
variables for Texas Air are linear combinations of those for Continental and New York Air
using the percentage ownership levels that held during the sample period.
A- 3ADDendix Q
In the stationary Capital Asset Pricing Model, returns for firm i on day t satisfy,
E[R—Ri I=
13E[Rmt_Rft I (C.1)
where is the information set at time t—1 and[Cov(R1, Rmt)/Var(rmt)1 is assumed
to be independent of both and t. This leads to a model for observable returns,
(Rjt—Rft) =i(R••R;) + flit' (C.2)
where E[it II_i} =E((Rmt_Rft)i_1] =0.52Letting aj it'it—1 denote the dollar
abnormal return, (C.2) becomes,
it—Rft) =fl(Rmt_Rft) + ] (C.3)
To derive equation (1) in the text, which is the dollar—based analog of the standard
returned—based event study estimating equation, suppose that the occurrence of events is an
i.i.d. process: some event will occur on each day t with probability q and the
characteristicsof events occurring on day t, conditional on some event occurring, have
density g(Z).S3 From (C.3) we can write:
(Rjt—Rft) =fi(lmt_Rít1+ E[IIt_i, 5t, Z]()+ it (C.4)
t —l
52The fact that E[(Rmt_Rft)Ujt I 1—J =0follows from the theoretical restriction that =
[COV(RitRmt)/VSX(Rmt)l•
53See Malatesta and Thompson [1985) for a related derivation.
A-4where E['1 l1—i =0and where, assuming independence of (Rmt_Rft) andZt)
conditionalon It_i' Rmt_Rft) i i_} =0.Next, note that we can replace E[1II1.
Z]in (C.4) by,
E[d1tII_i, 5t= 0]+5t{E[II_i, =1,Z]—E[d1tjI,t; = 0J},
or, letting (Z)bethe expected change in firm i's discounted profits conditional on events
with characteristicsoccurringon day t, by:
E[tII_i, 6t= 0]+ t (zt). (C.5)
Also, since E[t I1]=0,it must be that,
E[aII_1, 5 =0]=—qE[(Zt)IIt , =1]
=—qE[(Z)Io =1] (CC)
where the latter equality follows from the i.i.d. assumption. Substituting (C.5) and (C.6)





]+ fli(Rmt_Rft)+t { ]+ (C.7)
Finally, noting that q E[(Z)I =]isa constant, we get equation (1) in the text, which
then leads to our estimating equation (4).
Note that estimation of equation (4) under the above assumptions leads to consistent
estimates of the event effects despite the presence of some "anticipation" of these events (in
the sense that q> 0). Nevertheless, as elsewhere in the event study literature, it is worth
A-5noting two possible sources of inconsistency that can arise if the stochastic process of events
is other than that assumed above.
First, information about the likelihood of an event happening on day t and its
characteristics may arrive prior to day t, even though the processes for any two days t' and
tu may still be independent. In this case, q and E[(Z) Io=iI inequation (C.7) should be
functions of 1—i' q andE[(Z) I5t=1' sothat estimating (4) leads in general
to inconsistent estimates.54
We can, however, identify two situations of interest in which more can be said about
this bias. First consider the case where the event characteristics consist of a single variable,
such as SMt in Section 5.1. While it is difficult to say anything about the bias in equation
(4), it is possible to show that if we replace (/Vt_i) by the constant ,thenthe estimate
of the event variable is necessarily biased toward zero.55 In fact, estimates using this form
produce estimates nearly identical to those reported in the text.
The other case arises when there is a fixed effect included in f(.) in addition to one
or more other variables. In this case, we can think of the event characteristics in equation
(4) as terms of the form,
o[ vj +7[ v}
where Nt is the number of entry events on day t and z is the average of characteristic j
N.i N
for carrier i on day t. It can be shown that as long as EL(y t )j = )E(z'?), it—i it—i
4This is the sense in which "anticipation" matters for obtaining consistency; it is learning
that a particular day is unusually likely (or unlikely) to have an event that creates
problems.
55The argument for a single equation case is simple; for our SUR system with a constrained
parameter the argument makes use of the positive definiteness of A1, the inverse of the
covariance matrix of the errors.
A-6thenis estimated consistently in equation (4). For example, even if information becomes
known about the likelihood of an event occurring and about the likely number of events, as
long as each carrier has a fixed likelihood of being an incumbent (as measured by, say,
seatmiles) conditional on an event occurring, then the incumbency effect (e.g., effect per
seatmile) will be consistently estimated.
A second source of inconsistency arises when the events themselves are not
independent so that the occurrence of an event on day t has not only a direct impact but
also reveals information about the likelihood of an event on some day t >t.This problem,
which is always a concern in event studies, could lead to either over or underestimates of the
economic effect of an event56.
56For example, the simplest case to think about is where the number of entry events in the
sample period provides information about the number of events that will occur in some
later period. In a Bayesian learning model where information is revealed about People
Express' "propensity to enter", for example, we would get over—estimates. If the total
number of events is known DriOri and events today merely substitute for those tomorrow,
we get under—estimates. Note, though, that if events haveeconomic effect, then no bias
is introduced.
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